HISTORY
of
THE 306th Field Artillery
OPERATIONS of the 306th FIELD ARTILLERY
IN this history of
the operations of the 306th Field Artillery, but a
general outline will be given of the work of the regiment
from the viewpoint of the Operations Officer. It is
difficult to set forth a history of the regiment without
becoming involved in a general discussion of the
operations of the entire division as the 155 howitzers
operated as divisional artillery, and, taking part in all
major operations and most of the minor affairs of the
division, worked principally in conjunction with the
infantry and therefore operated, as a rule, hand in hand
with the infantry. Although the operations of the
infantry and of the artillery dovetailed, it would be
obviously unfair, and possibly even fallacious, to
include in this outline an exposition of the results of
operations of the infantry which are based on information
not always authentic. For this reason and for the
additional reason that it is rarely possible to
ascertain exactly the result of artillery firing, this
history will be confined as far as possible to statements
of principal actions up to the point where the artillery
preparations were completed, and no attempt made to set
forth or analyze the ultimate result of operations as
they effected the infantry situation.
The operations on the Lorraine front were comparatively
simple. The regiment supported its own infantry covering
a large front of some fourteen kilometers. Baccarat was
in fact principally a rest and training sector, and for
the artillery meant little more than the opportunity to
enable organization commanders to learn to operate under
field conditions, to smooth out problems of supply and
coordination, to realize the difficulty of bringing up
guns and setting them into position, and to give everyone
a mild idea of what the Front was like. Probably no one
was deceived into thinking that the regiment was in the
conflict in earnest, although firing for registration was
done and a pretty piece of work by Battery F in blowing
up a church filled with minnenwerfer shells added a
little real atmosphere.
The reason for the maintenance of a rest and training
sector were obvious enough, although distasteful to
American ideas of warfare. Lorraine was not badly damaged
by the war, and the French, looking forward to the time
when Alsace-Lorraine should be theirs again, wished to
keep it so, successfully preventing American efforts to
force aggressive fighting on that front-this aside from
the desire of the French command to retain part of the
battle line where troops which were exhausted from
combat, both in men and material, could be rested and
refitted without taking them to the rear and thus
thinning the front. The Germans, also anxious to keep a
rest front, adopted the same attitude, resulting
eventually in a sort of " gentlemen's agreement
" to refrain from any heavy action in Lorraine. This
was carried out to such an extreme that there came into
existence by unwritten mutual understanding a
"retaliation schedule" clearly understood and
observed by both sides. Under this schedule the shelling
of a town within the French lines would promptly be
answered by fire on two towns of comparatively equal
importance within the German lines. The towns were listed
side by side in copies of the schedule furnished to each
artillery commander for his compliance. The ammunition
supplied to American artillery was reduced to such a
small quantity that a heavy bombardment on the Germans
was rendered impossible, and action was confined to local
infantry raids in which the heavy artillery had little
part.
Finally came the order to pull out of the Lorraine front,
and everyone knew that the regiment was about to plunge
into the fight in earnest. And they were not in error,
for from the easy life at Baccarat, the regiment moved
into one of the most hotly shelled and bitterly contested
sectors of the front,-the Vesle. It was clear in every
mind that the regiment was nearing the crucial period-the
entry into real battle, the carrying on of the tremendous
victory of Chateau-Thierry. Early in the morning of
August 13th the tired troops drew into the Forft de
Nesles, and on the nights of August 14th and 15th the
guns were placed in position, relieving the 13th Field
Artillery. The relief was conducted amid heavy shelling
of the roads without casualty to the 3o6th, but with
heavy losses in men and horses to the 13th.
At 8.20 P.M. on the night of August 17th the commanding
officer of the First Battalion reported to the regimental
commander that Battery A was undergoing a heavy
bombardment and in a few minutes the Second Battalion was
greasing shells that were soon on their way to a
suspected German battery. The fire on Battery A continued
and at 8.40 the Third Battalion was called on to take
part in counter-battery fire on another suspected
battery. The fire on Battery A soon ceased and in the
absence of a planned program our fire was also
discontinued. With the exception of hostile shelling of
our roads and the regimental Post Command all was
comparatively quiet until 11:50 when the commanding
officer of the Third Battalion telephoned that Battery F
was being shelled and that the personnel had been forced
to take cover. At midnight the Second Battalion was again
busy firing on suspected German batteries to counter
their fire. The rest of the night was comparatively
quiet.
Each day and night was more or less of a repetition of
the experiences of the first night, although we did not
by any means each time await German fire before firing
ourselves. As a rule, however, fire was not opened on a
suspected German battery unless it was recently and
accurately located, as it was well known that the Germans
moved their batteries frequently from one position to
another, but almost every night their main roads and
cross-roads were heavily shelled by our batteries.
An account of the numerous firings engaged in, day and
night, on German batteries, congregations of German
troops, vehicles on roads, machine-gun nests, crossroads,
etc., would be of but little interest and therefore will
not be included in this outline of operations.
On the night of August 21st fire was opened by the First
Battalion on the Tannerie. The Tannerie was near Fismes
at the railroad and close to the Vesle. Machine guns in
and about the Tannerie had been causing our infantry
considerable trouble, and the 3o6th was ordered to fire
on it preliminary to an attack by our infantry. The fire
was duly executed but when the infantry got there the
Tannerie was no longer in existence. It had been so
thoroughly and completely destroyed that nothing was left
but a scattered mass of debris.
Our line was pressed back slightly in the center on
August 22d, but we still held the erstwhile Tannerie.
During most of the night of August 22d-23d all of the
batteries fired heavily in support of the infantry in
their endeavor to straighten the line. The next night the
infantry made another attack at the same place, again
supported by the 3o6th Field Artillery, although without
much more success. Early in the morning of August 25th,
the French division on our left made a strong attack west
of Bazoches in which the Second and Third Battalions took
part.
On the morning of August 27th took place an unsuccessful
attack on Bazoches. All the batteries fired heavily but
the infantry were unable to take and hold the town. From
this time on the 3o6th paid particular attention to
Bazoches with the purpose of making the town untenable
for the Germans, and although it was not taken until the
Germans retired along the whole front, there is little
doubt but that the Germans found it a terrible and an
expensive place to hold. Day and night in addition to
the firing of other missions our shells were dropped into
Bazoches. At twelve midnight September 2d-3d, 1918, our
fire into the town ceased, and Bazoches was unmolested
for three hours. At 3.03 A.M. Corps Gas Troops poured a
gas projector attack into the place accompanied by a
rolling barrage by the 304th Field Artillery (75mm.) and
the 3o6th Field Artillery. When the barrage was completed
the 3o6th returned to the usual destruction fire. When
the division advanced on September 4th, it was possible
to observe accurately the extent of the damage inflicted
by our artillery, and there is no question but that the
3o6th honestly earned the title, which it then received
of the " Wreckers of Bazoches.
An attempt was made on the morning of September 4th to
drive the Germans from the Chateau du Diable and
surrounding woods, south of the Rouen-Reims Road. As at
Bazoches, this terrain was wonderfully adapted for
defense, the heavy woods surrounding the Chateau
affording excellent concealment and protection for the
defenders. The wall-rimmed road running along the top of
the abrupt slope in the rear of the Chateau furnished
almost impregnable machine-gun positions. The Third
Battalion fired for several hours on the road over the
Chateau, then on the Chateau and stables, and then again
on the road. Within this period, the Ravin de L'Homme
Mort, reported to contain a German camp, was subjected to
a gas concentration by Batteries B, C, D, and E, the
304th Field Artillery blocking both ends of the ravine
with a rapid fire of high explosive and shrapnel.
The German artillery fire had slackened considerably
during the preceding two days, and many large fires in
their rear areas were observed, indicating an early
retirement of their lines. This was confirmed during the
day of September 4th when the infantry reported that the
Germans were retreating and that patrols were being sent
over the Vesle to keep contact with them. During the
night of September 4th- 5th the artillery followed as
fast as the hastily prepared bridges flung across the
Vesle would permit. It was then that the 306th disproved
the generally accepted theory that the heavy artillery
should follow the light, for but one battalion of light
artillery of the brigade succeeded in crossing before the
306th. This advance marked our first movement in the
" Oise-Aisne Offensive," aimed to drive the
Germans back of the Aisne and the Chemin des Dames. At
this time General Mangin's divisions were astride the
Chemin des Dames and driving eastward while we were
attempting to force the Germans back over the Aisne by
frontal attacks.
At 8.40 A.M. on September 5th the infantry were reported
held up by serious machine-gun fire from the ravines near
Merval and Serval. Under personal directions from the
divisional commander the Third Battalion halted in its
march and unlimbered in the streets of Fismes, firing
rapidly for thirty minutes into the ravines designated.
This was the only occasion on which the regiment
conducted fire without any concealment whatever, the
operation being performed in full view of a German
captive balloon.
During September 5th, 6th, and 7th many missions of
harassing and interdiction fire were executed by the
batteries, particular attention being paid to the
defences on La Petite Montagne. The fire on La Petite
Montagne, as a matter of fact, was almost continuous, day
and night, from September 5th to September 15th. On
September 8th starting at 6.45 P.m. the Second and Third
Battalions took part in a rolling barrage followed by
support fire, in an attempt to clear La Petite Montagne
of the enemy. Beginning at 5.15 A.M. on the morning of
September 14th and continuing most of the day all
batteries delivered a heavy fire on German positions in
support of another attack to drive the Germans back of
the Aisne along the entire division front. In general,
the fire of batteries from the time of the crossing of
the Vesle until the division withdrew from the sector to
proceed to the Argonne was conducted almost entirely
against enemy infantry-a fire that continued without rest
on scores of points which were known or suspected to
harbor the enemy.
The batteries turned over their positions on the evening
of September 15th to the 155's of the 8th Italian
Division and withdrew, with few casualties, to the Bois
de Meuniere, near Coulonges. After a hard road march the
regiment drew into the Foret d' Argonne on the night of
September 23d-24th and immediately commenced preparations
to take part in a colossal attack of which whispers had
already been heard-" from Switzerland to the
Sea."
Extreme caution was taken to insure secrecy of the
operations. For example, forward observers wore French
uniforms, and a complete telephone system was installed
but no conversations in English passed over the lines
until the opening of the attack. The morning of September
26th was set for the attack, and until that time all
movement within our lines was reduced to a minimum. Very
little trouble from enemy artillery or bombing planes was
encountered during this period, although the Germans were
evidently suspicious, for there was considerable
aeroplane activity for the purpose of observation and
photography.
As registration would reveal the concentration of
artillery, the guns could not be adjusted by observation
of fire. The pieces were therefore laid with precise
care, advantage being taken of every available means of
orientation, including astronomical observation, to check
and recheck. The battery positions of the Second
Battalion were obstructed by trees, but these were not
cut down and removed until nightfall of September 25th
for fear of revealing the position.
All guns opened fire at 2.55 A.M., September 26th on
enemy strong points, dugouts, crossroads, etc., and
continued this heavy shelling until 5.30 A.M., when the
fire was shifted to a heavy support barrage five hundred
meters in front of the 75mm. barrage on the German front
lines. At the end of twenty-five minutes the infantry
went "over the top" and the barrage preceded
them at the rate of a one hundred meter jump each five
minutes. When the barrage reached a certain designated
line, fire was again shifted to enemy strong points,
assembly areas, etc., farther in the rear. The rate of
fire was reduced several times after the completion of
the barrage and fire ceased entirely at 2.40 P.M.
September 26th. During this opening operation of the
Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the regiment fired a total of
fifty-three hundred rounds.
In the afternoon of September 26th the Second Battalion
moved forward to La Harazee, further advance being
impossible on account of the condition of the roads-roads
that for four years had been in No Man's Land, and had
now been made hopelessly impassable by our terrific
bombardment and by German mines detonated just preceding
the retreat. On the following day the Third Battalion
also moved to La Harazee, and on September 29th the First
Battalion advanced to the Abri St. Louis.
The advance of the infantry continued; we followed, the
Second Battalion moving to position about two and a half
kilometers southwest of Binarville on October 2d, the
Third Battalion close by on October 10th, and to
positions about two kilometers north of Langon on the
following day. The First Battalion took positions south
of Chatel-Chehery on October 10th, and advanced southeast
of La Besogne on October 12th. The Second Battalion
advanced about one kilometer southeast of Grand Ham on
October 11th. One gun of Battery D was taken up close to
the front lines on September 29th to afford closer
liaison with the infantry in the reduction of troublesome
machine-gun nests but more particularly for the moral
support afforded the infantry.
After the opening attack and up to October 18th all
batteries took part in firing to support the infantry
advance, a total of about seventeen thousand five hundred
rounds being fired during that period. This fire was
delivered principally in the destruction of enemy
assembly areas, machine-gun nests, barbed wire and
trenches, in counter battery, and in harassing and
interdiction fire on roads and crossroads.
The infantry activities were in the nature of a steady
pressure rather than separate blows, so that these
firings were almost continuous and shifted rapidly from
one target to another. The principal single attacks were
the action in the relief of a battalion of the 308th
Infantry on October 7th (the so-called " Lost
Battalion"), the taking of St. Juvin (Kreim-hilde
Stellung) on October 14th, the attack on Che-vieres on
October 15th, the attacks on Grand Pre, and the two
attacks of the 78th Division on the Bois des Loges and
Champigneulle on October 16th and 17th.
The firing in the relief of the "Lost
Battalion" was carefully prepared and well executed,
as has been evidenced by the report of an exhaustive
investigation conducted immediately after the action made
necessary by the ill-founded charges of an officer of
high rank that the firing had been wild and had caused
casualties to our infantry. In this connection the
following extracts from the report of Lieut. Col. James
A. Galloghy, acting as Inspector for the First Army
Corps, is of interest:
I find that the firing of the 3o6th Field Artillery on
the morning of the 7th of October, 1918, was well
directed upon the target assigned to it; that it was
carefully conducted with due precaution as to safety, and
certainty of firing-that this regiment did not cause the
death of Lieutenant Fiske. There is direct evidence
showing-not only that the shell that killed Lieutenant
Fiske was not fired by a gun of the type with which this
regiment is armed but also that he was killed by a large
shell with two rotating bands, not spaced as those on
French 155 ammunition is spaced, with indicated rifling
differing markedly from the rifling of any type of French
155 and approaching closing to the rifling of the German
14.9.
The action directed on St. Juvin, which was the main
effort of the division in the attack on the Kreimhilde
Stellung, opened with a two hour artillery preparation
from 6.30 A.M. to 8.30 A.M., on October 14th-the fire
advancing after 8.30 A.M. with the movement of the
infantry. The attack on Chevieres followed a short
artillery preparation from 6.30 A.M. to 7.30 A.M. on
October 15th. In this action the First Battalion and
Second Battalion were placed under the orders of the
commanding generals of the 153d and 154th Infantry
Brigades respectively, the Third Battalion being held in
reserve-a sharp departure from the principles of
artillery that resulted before the completion of the
action in the expenditure of ammunition, not justified by
the situation in fire, on scattered areas and roads. On
the night of October 15th the infantry of the 78th
Division relieved that of the 77th Division, but the
artillery remained in the lines. On the morning of
October 16th the infantry moved on the Bois des Loges,
with the First Battalion of this regiment supporting the
attack under the orders of the Commanding General 155th
Infantry Brigade and the Second Battalion under the
orders of the Commanding-General of the 156th Infantry
Brigade; the Third Battalion being in reserve.
The capture of the
Bois-des-Loges and Champigneulle was again attempted on October 17th. On
this occasion the First Battalion was subject to the orders of the
Commanding Officer, 304th Field Artillery, and the Second Battalion to those of
the Commanding Officer of the 305th Field Artillery-the
Third Battalion in reserve. Fire was executed during the
night of October 16th-17th on Grand Pre, the
Bois-des-Loges, and Champign6ulle and on the morning of
October 17th at H hour (6-30 A.M.) was shifted to other
targets.
On October 18th the regiment was placed in reserve and
drew back to La Harazee, returning to the lines on
October 25th. The First and Second Battalions took
positions near La Pylone (Cornay) and the Third Battalion
near Fleville. But little fire except that for adjustment
was executed until November 1st, when the last great blow
of the war was launched. Complete and comprehensive
orders for this attack included arrangements for rapid
movement forward of all batteries in the event of a
collapse of the German positions. The infantry attacked
on the morning of November 1st after a thirty minute
artillery preparation and advanced rapidly, covered by
powerful artillery support. All batteries fired in
accordance with a carefully ar-ranged firing schedule, consuming 3500
rounds of ammunition on enemy strong points and assembly areas. On the
following day the infantry continued to advance so rapidly that the
problem of transportation became acute. Exhaustion, sickness, and enemy
fire had by this time reduced the strength of the regiment in animals by
two thirds, and made it impossible for all batteries to keep up with the
advance. For this reason on November 2d the First Battalion was
immobilized and its horses turned over to the Third Battalion to enable
the latter to move to positions at St. Juvin. On the same day the Second
Battalion advanced to Moulin-de-Champigneulle. On the following day the
horses of D Battery were turned over to C Battery, and C Battery moved on to Thenorgues, the Third Battalion
advancing to Bar. On November 4th the Third Battalion
took position one kilometer south of Sommauthe, and on
the following day advanced to position near La Besace, C
Battery advancing to Sommauthe. The Third Battalion moved
to position at Haracourt on November 7th and C Battery to
position near Raucourt on November 9th. During the
period from November 2d to November 11th, the date of the
Armistice, the more important and interesting missions
were the raking fire of the First and Second Battalions
on machine-gun nests in Moulin-de-Champigneulle and the
woods northeast of the Moulin on November 2nd, in support
of the infantry, and the fire of the Third Battalion on
the road at Stonne on November 4th. The road through
Stonne inclines steeply and makes three extremely sharp
turns, making difficult the passage of heavy material.
Observers reported a huge jam of German vehicles at
Stonne late in the afternoon on November 4th, and the
Third Battalion was given the task of destroying them.
The result of the fire was not known, further observation
having been rendered impossible by nightfall, Some
counter -battery work was done by the Third Battalion on
November 9th.
In conclusion it may be fitting to state that without
question the success of the 306th Field Artillery in
conducting its operations accurately and rapidly under
difficult and trying conditions is due principally to
Colonel Frederic H. Smith, whose foresight and unusual
ability to organize and coordinate established the
regiment on a firm footing that could not fail to carry
it through with distinction and honor.
E. E. NELSON,
Captain, 306th F. A.
Operations Officer.